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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Behold, thou shalt conceive, and bear a son; and now drink no strong wine 
or strong drink . . . 2 
This Biblical verse illustrates that the societal proscription against pregnant 
women drinking alcohol is centuries old.  The recent tragedy is that substance abuse 
among pregnant women has dramatically increased to the point that prenatal alcohol 
and drug abuse is a serious public health problem.  In 2001, the United States 
Supreme Court noted that the “problem of crack babies was perceived in the late 
1980’s as a national epidemic, promoting considerable concern both in the medical 
                                                                
1Associate Dean for Student Affairs and George H. Mahon Professor of Law, Texas Tech 
University School of Law.   
2Judges 13:7, THE BIBLE, King James Version. 
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community and among the general populace.”3  According to a study released by the 
National Institute on Drug Abuse, five percent of the four million women who gave 
birth in the United States in 1992 used illegal drugs during their pregnancy.4  
“Studies have concluded that the problem is pervasive, affecting deliveries in both 
public health clinics and private obstetric practices, without regard for 
socioeconomic classifications.”5 
The problem has captured the attention of medical professionals, legislators, 
prosecutors, journalists, and legal scholars.  A number of law review articles discuss 
issues related to maternal substance abuse.  The majority of these articles fall into 
two general categories.  The first group emphasizes the harms of substance abuse 
and the need for criminal or civil commitment statutes to curb illegal drug use by 
pregnant women.6  The second category of commentaries focuses on a woman’s 
constitutional rights and the dangers of state intervention.7  Many of the articles also 
address the issue of recognition of fetal rights and potential conflicts between the 
                                                                
3Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70, note 1 (2001).  In Ferguson, ten women 
challenged a state hospital policy that subjected some pregnant women to mandatory testing 
for cocaine.  Id. at 73.  Under the policy, pregnant women who tested positive for cocaine had 
an option to receive drug treatment or to be arrested.  Id. at 72.  The general question that the 
Court decided was whether the State hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test to obtain 
evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable 
search when the patient does not consent to the procedure.  Id. at 69-70.  The majority 
concluded that without patient consent, the searches were unreasonable in view of the law 
enforcement focus of the policy to arrest and prosecute drug abusing mothers.  Id. at 81-86.  
According to the majority, the State interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter 
pregnant women from using cocaine could not justify a departure from the general rule 
requiring a valid warrant for nonconsensual searches. Id. at 84-85. 
4Robert Mathias, NIDA Survey Provides First National Data on Drug Use During 
Pregnancy, (Jan. 1995) available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol10N1/ 
NIDASurvey.html.  Marijuana and cocaine were the most frequently used illegal drugs, with 
2.9% of the respondents reporting that they used marijuana, and 1.1% reporting that they used 
cocaine at some time during their pregnancies.  This study was based on a survey of self-
reported data from a 1992 national sample of women who gave birth in urban and rural 
hospitals in the United States. 
5James Denison, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal 
Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1991) (noting that some reports reveal a 
higher concentration in inner cities with the highest cocaine incidence occurring among 
African-Americans). 
6See, e.g., Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal 
Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 239 (1990) (questioning the punitive 
approach to the problem of prenatal drug use); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
1419 (1991) (analyzing the disparate impact of criminalization on women of color). 
7See, e.g., Denise K. Cahalane, Court-Ordered Confinement of Pregnant Women, 15 NEW 
ENG. J ON CRIM. & CIV. Confinement 203 (1989) (proposing that the government intervene 
and order confinement for the sake of a viable fetus); Heather M. White, Unborn Child: Can 
You Be Protected? 22 U. RICH. L REV. 285 (1988) (arguing that the unborn is a person entitled 
to legal protection and that the pregnant woman’s right to privacy and liberty must yield to the 
government action if intervention is necessary to prevent serious injury or to save the life of 
the unborn child).   
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mother’s rights and fetal rights.8  Various authors oppose government intervention, 
cautioning that such intervention would lead to the recognition of fetal rights at the 
expense of women’s right to privacy and personal autonomy.9 
This article takes a different approach in considering the problem of prenatal 
drug abuse.10  After briefly discussing government intervention and constitutional 
issues, this article will consider the concept of duty and correlative rights. This 
discussion of duty and correlative rights suggests that the government can take 
measures to curb prenatal drug use without recognizing fetal rights.  The article 
concludes with a discussion of the utility of criminal legislation as compared to 
public health legislation that treats drug addiction as a disease requiring treatment.  
As formulated, the proposal for public health legislation is not based on any concept 
of fetal rights.  Instead, it is based on the recognition of societal interests, as well as 
the woman’s needs. 
II.  THE APPROPRIATENESS AND OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
A.  Effects of Prental Drug Use 
An evaluation of government intervention to curb prenatal drug use requires a 
basic understanding of the effects of drug use by pregnant women.  Given the 
maternal-fetal link, drugs such as cocaine directly and indirectly affect the fetus from 
conception to birth.11  “By depriving the fetus of oxygen, cocaine use threatens fetal 
development.”12  Because cocaine freely crosses the placental barrier to the fetus and 
cannot re-circulate back across the placental barrier into the mother’s bloodstream, 
the fetus may become much more severely addicted than the mother.13  
                                                                
8See, e.g., Louise B. Wright, Fetus v. Mother: Criminal Liability for Maternal Substance 
Abuse, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1285 (1990) (discussing the conflict between the constitutional 
right of the fetus to life and the mother’s constitutional rights to privacy and control over her 
own body). 
9See, e.g., Caroline S. Palmer, The Risks of State Intervention in Preventing Prenatal 
Alcohol Abuse and the Viability of An Inclusive Approach: Arguments for Limiting Punitive 
and Coercive Prenatal Alcohol Abuse Legislation in Minnesota, 10 HASTINGS L. J. 287 (1999); 
Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Rowe v. Wade, 62 ALB. 
L. REV. 999 (1999). 
10For the purposes of this article, the term “drug” designates illegal substances, not alcohol 
and prescribed medications.  Although gestational alcohol abuse (GAS) is very serious and 
widespread, this article does not discuss that problem.  Legislation targeting GAS is more 
complicated than intervention targeting illegal drug use by pregnant women because imbibing 
alcohol is legal. 
11Joyce Lind Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure:  How Should the Government Intervene, 
18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61, 64 (1990) (reviewing the physiological impact that the mother’s drug 
use has on the fetus). 
12Kristen Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful Response, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 377, 379 (1990) (citing Chavez, Mulinare & Codero, Maternal Cocaine Use 
During Pregnancy as a Risk Factor for Congenital Urogenital Anomalies, 262 JAMA 795, 
798 (1989)). 
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Malformations of urogenital, cardiac and central nervous systems can also result 
from gestational cocaine abuse.  “Neurological problems caused by cocaine can 
permanently affect motor skills, reflexes and coordination.”14  Cocaine-addicted 
women experience complications during labor and delivery15 and deliver infants pre-
term (less than 37 weeks gestation).16  These babies are born with lower birth 
weights, shorter body lengths, and smaller head circumferences as compared to drug-
free babies.17  Physicians consider these babies to be medically at risk.18   
After birth, the infants experience acute withdrawal from the drug.  This 
withdrawal persists in a sub-acute form for four to six months after birth.19  As a 
result of these complications, these infants need intensive medical care estimated to 
cost approximately $100,000 per infant.20  A 1992 study estimated that the direct 
costs related to prenatal drug exposure were $387 million.21  These figures do not 
reflect the costs of the long-term effects of prenatal drug exposure.22 
B.  Objectives of and Basis for Government Intervention 
Prosecutors and others have articulated a number of reasons that justify 
government intervention to curb prenatal drug use.  The most common reason given 
is to protect the unborn child of the addicted mother.23  Presumably, early 
intervention such as commitment or incarceration might also protect the mother. 
A number of commentators and medical professionals have criticized this 
position, arguing that criminal legislation has the opposite effect of deterring women 
                                                          
13Michelle D. Wilkins, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse:  An Analysis of 
Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L. J. 1401, 1402 (1990) (citing a telephone 
interview with Wayne F. Hooper, Unit Director of the Substance Abuse Unit, Northwest 
Georgia Regional Hopsital, Rome, Georgia (March 22, 1990)). 
14Lichtenberg, supra note 12, at 380, citing Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine 
Use in Pregnancy, 261 J. AM MED. A. 1741, 1744 (1989) (hereinafter Temporal Patterns). 
15Terres, supra note 11, at 65 referring to Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters 
of Risk, 35 THE PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1403, 1406 (Dec. 1988) (hereinafter 
Parameters of Risk). 
16Terres, supra note 11, at 66 referring to Little, Snell, Klein & Gilstrap, Cocaine Abuse 
During Pregnancy: Maternal & Fetal Implications 73 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 157, 158 (1989). 
17Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1402. 
18Terres, supra note 11, at 66 citing D. Holmes, J. Reich & J. Paternak, THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INFANTS BORN AT RISK 1 (1989). 
19Id. at 67 (citing Parameters of Risk, supra note 15, at 1405). 
20Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1401. 
21Henrick Harwood et al., The Economic Costs of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in the United 
States, 1992 Health Care Costs, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG ABUSE, available at 
http://www.nida.nih.gov/economiccosts/chapter4.html. 
22Terres, supra note 11, at 68.  There is some indication that gestational drug use may 
have long-term effects on child development.   
23See, e.g., Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for 
Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1998) (describing 
arguments supporting government intervention). 
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from obtaining prenatal medical care and treatment.24  The critics argue that pregnant 
women will not seek medical care because they fear detection by physicians who are 
operating as agents of the state.25  Nevertheless, some legislators and prosecutors still 
believe that actions to curb prenatal drug abuse serve community interests.  In 
support of their position, they point to the extraordinary amount that the government 
pays for medical care for drug-dependent newborns.  Apparently, public sentiment 
supports some form of government intervention, in particular criminalization.26 
To address the problem of prenatal drug use, the state might use various tools 
including prosecution, dependency proceedings, or civil commitment.27  Prosecutors 
in the United States have already resorted to criminal prosecutions under existing 
laws.28  They have also presented myriad proposals to address the problem, including 
the adoption of new criminal statutes.   
Regardless of the specific approach used, the government can rely on two sources 
of authority in taking action to curb prenatal drug use. First the government can use 
the doctrine of parens patriae.  Second, state governments might exercise the police 
power preserved for the states under the United States Constitution.   
Parens patriae is an ancient doctrine that provides states with limited 
paternalistic power to protect individuals who lack capacity to act in their own 
interest.  For example, parens patriae authority gives the state the power to enact 
child abuse laws, to transfer custody of a child from a parent to the state, to order 
treatment for a viable fetus in utero, and to compel a woman to submit to a caesarian 
section.  In Prince v. Massachusetts the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
the state’s parens patriae authority empowers the state to regulate the family in the 
public interest.29  In noting that the state may guard the general interest in the youth’s 
well being, the United States Supreme Court explained that the state has a wide 
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in situations affecting the 
child’s welfare.30 
                                                                
24See e.g.  Kristen Burgess, Protective Custody, Will It Eradicate Fetal Abuse and Lead to 
the Perfect Womb? 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 227, 272 (1998) (warning that women will distrust 
their doctors and stop seeking treatment altogether). 
25Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctor’s Orders: Unmasking the Doctors’ Fiduciary 
Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW U. L: Rev. 451, 484 (2000).  One scholar maintains 
that physicians violate their fiduciary duty to their pregnant patients when the physicians forge 
“an alliance with criminal justice authorities in order to detect and punish patients who use 
drugs.”   
26See Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, 76 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (Mar., 1990) 
(reporting survey results revealing that 71% of the 1500 people polled supported criminal 
penalties for pregnant women whose illegal drug use injures their babies). 
27Lichtenberg, supra note 12, at 384. 
28Suzanne D’Amico, Inherently Female Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect: A Gender-
Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 855, 861 (2001).  For example, a Florida 
prosecutor brought a case for delivery of drugs to a minor, asserting that the umbilical cord 
was used to pass drugs to the child during the seconds immediately after birth.   
29321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
30Id. at 166-67. 
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In addition to parens patriae, states utilize their police power to promote the 
public welfare and to prevent citizens from harming one another.31  Speaking of the 
evils that impede the “healthy, well rounded growth of young people” the United 
States Supreme Court in Prince stated that legislation appropriately designed to 
reach such evils is within the state’s police power.32  The state has this authority 
notwithstanding the parents’ claim to control the child.33 
C.  Prosecutions under Existing Criminal Law 
Prosecutors have attacked maternal substance abuse using different approaches.  
Between 1985 and 1998 at least 240 women in the United States have been 
prosecuted for using illegal drugs while pregnant.34  Generally prosecutors brought 
cases under existing child abuse and child endangerment laws.35  Many cases were 
eventually dismissed because the courts have been “unwilling to stretch criminal 
child endangerment and child support statutes beyond their most obvious purposes–
to protect only already born children . . .”36  The Supreme Courts of Kentucky, 
Nevada and Ohio have held that a mother cannot be convicted of child abuse or child 
endangerment for using drugs while pregnant.37  In contrast to these decisions, the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that South Carolina’s child abuse statute 
protects a viable fetus as a child.38  In reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted 
the term “child” to include a viable fetus.39  Furthermore, the court concluded that its 
interpretation of the word “person” to include a fetus was consistent with the 
legislature’s intended purpose in enacting the child abuse statute.40  The two women 
who were convicted challenged the court’s interpretation seeking review by the 
United States Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court refused to hear the case.41 
                                                                
31Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 
1198-99 (1980) (discussing the use of state police power). 
32321 U.S. at 168-69. 
33Id. at 169. 
34Nancy Kubasek & Melissa Hinds, The Communitarian Case Against Prosecutions for 
Prenatal Drug Abuse, 22 WOMAN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 2 (2000). 
35Kristen Barrett, Note, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Dealing to the Unborn, 33 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 221, 229 (1991). 
36Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1404.  For a discussion of two California cases where the 
judges declined to apply the criminal statutes to unborn children, see Wilkins supra note 13, at 
1411-15.  One case was brought under the penal code section making it a misdemeanor for a 
parent to fail to provide necessary support for minor children and the other indictment was 
brought under the penal code section relating to endangering a child. 
37Tara-Nicholle B. DeLouth, Pregnant Drug Addicts as Child Abusers:  A South Carolina 
Ruling, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 96 (1999). 
38Whitner v. State, 492 S.E. 2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1145 (1998). 
39Id. at 778. 
40Id. at 780-81. 
41523 U.S. 1145 (1998). 
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Other prosecutions have based cases on laws prohibiting the possession of drugs 
and the delivery of drugs to minors.42  One conviction that received national attention 
was the case of Jennifer Johnson, who was convicted of violating the Florida statute 
prohibiting delivery of drugs to minors.43  Such convictions based on existing laws 
have been challenged on a number of grounds.  In allowing these prosecutions, 
courts are applying to fetuses the state laws intended to protect children. In the 
absence of clear legislative intent, this amounts to an improper extension of the law.  
These prosecutions appear to violate the due process requirements of notice and fair 
warning because they require a novel construction of the law.  Arguably, the mothers 
did not have the requisite notice that their drug use would later be treated as a 
violation of the drug distribution statutes that are intended to apply to the sale of 
illegal drugs, not the mere use of illegal drugs.44  Furthermore, opponents of 
prosecutions have also asserted equal protection arguments because pregnant women 
are singled out for prosecution.45  
D.  New Legislation 
The enactment of specific legislation criminalizing certain maternal behavior 
during pregnancy and imposing liability for the harmful effects of maternal drug use 
should satisfy the due process requirements that the legislature, rather than the 
courts, define criminal offenses.46  Some states have reacted to the unsuccessful 
prosecutions by adopting legislation that directly addresses prenatal alcohol and drug 
abuse.  For example, Minnesota has passed a comprehensive law requiring that 
physicians administer toxicology tests and report suspected addicts to child welfare 
agencies.47 The child welfare agency can then seek civil commitment of a pregnant 
woman who is using illegal drugs if she refuses or fails recommended voluntary 
treatment.48  Although this legislation is not criminal in nature, some authors still 
maintain that addicts will shun all treatment, rather than be subject to commitment.49 
                                                                
42Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1409 (noting that prosecutions in Georgia, Florida, Michigan, 
Massachusetts, and South Carolina have relied on laws prohibiting the possession of drugs and 
the delivery of drugs to minors). 
43State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (18th Jud. Cir. Seminole County, Fla., July 13, 
1989).  In this slip opinion the trial judge stated, “I am convinced and find that the term 
‘deliver’ includes the passage of cocaine or a derivative of it from the body of the mother into 
the body of her child through an umbilical cord after birth occurs.”  See Wilkins, supra note 
13, at 1410-11 for criticism of the court’s construction of the applicable Florida statute. 
44Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 278, 286 
(1990). 
45Id. at 286.  See also Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 
13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 165 (1991) (urging that pre-birth paternal duties be considered 
as pre-birth maternal duties are considered). 
46Doretta M. McGinnis, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-exposed Babies:  Constitutional 
and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 513 (1990). 
47For a discussion of the features of the Minnesota law, see Judith M. Nyhus Johnson, 
Minnesota’s “Crack Baby Law”: Weapon of War or Link in a Chain? 8 LAW & IN EQ. 485, 
491 (1990). 
48See Carol Gosain, Protective Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of 
Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on Wisconsin ex rel Angela v. Druziki, 5 GEORGE MASON L. 
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A few states including Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah 
have expanded the definition of “neglected minor” to include babies born with drugs 
in their systems.50  For example, the Massachusetts statute treats prenatal abuse as a 
criminal offense that medical providers must report once they determine that a child 
is physically dependent on an addictive drug.51  Other states rejected legislation 
including more draconian measures such as those requiring that some contraceptive 
devise, such as Norplant, be implanted in first time drug offenders who fail to 
complete a drug treatment program.52  While adoption of tightly drawn legislation 
might satisfy procedural due process requirements such as notice and fair warning, 
such legislation still poses other constitutional questions related to maternal interests 
and state interests.53 
III.  BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND THE  
MOTHER–CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW LEGISLATION 
As noted above, various commentators maintain that government intervention 
creates a conflict between a woman’s rights on one hand and the state interest and 
“fetal rights” on the other hand.  They maintain that any intervention impinges on 
privacy rights recognized in Roe v. Wade.54  In invalidating the Texas criminal 
statute that prohibited all elective abortions, the United States Supreme Court in Roe 
explicitly refused to extend constitutional protection to fetuses.  As stated by the 
Court, the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution does not include the unborn.55  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
recognized that the privacy right regarding procreative decision-making protects a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.56  Applying a strict scrutiny test, the court 
identified two legitimate state interests that become compelling at different points 
during the pregnancy.57 
                                                          
REV. 799, n. 316 (1997) (noting that the Minnesota statute has not faced a constitutional 
challenge). 
49Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1429. 
50Id. 
51Kubasek & Hinds, supra note 34, at 6. 
52Id. at 7 (referring to legislation defeated in Ohio). 
53Some authors treat “fetal rights” as a separate category and approach the issues of 
prenatal drug use in terms of “fetal rights” versus maternal rights.  E.g., Tom Richoff, 
Protecting the Fetus from Maternal Drug and Alcohol Abuse: A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST. 
MARY’S L. J. 259, 286-87 (1989). 
54410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
55Id. at 158. 
56Id. at 153. 
57From the end of the first trimester until the point of viability, the state may regulate the 
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to the state interest in preserving and 
protecting the health of the pregnant woman.  From the point of viability until birth, a state 
interest in protecting the “potentiality of human life” allows it to proscribe all abortions except 
those necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.  Id. at 163-64. 
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Subsequently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the United States 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the state interest in protecting potential life, denying that 
the interest only came into existence at the point of viability.58  Later in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court went a step further in rejecting the trimester 
approach first articulated in Roe.59 
While reaffirming the “essential holding of Roe” related to a woman’s right to 
terminate her pregnancy, the Casey court made the following observation: 
Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in 
establishing not only the woman’s liberty but also the State’s “important 
and legitimate interest in potential life.”  That portion of the decision in 
Roe has been given too little acknowledgement and implementation by the 
court in its subsequent cases. (citations omitted)60   
Although Roe, Webster, and Casey provide some framework in which to analyze 
conflicts between maternal privacy rights and the state’s interests in protecting the 
fetus, the state, and maternal interests implicated by fetal abuse legislation are 
different from those in the abortion context.  As stated in one commentary: 
The maternal privacy right at issue in fetal abuse cases focuses not on a 
woman’s decision whether to continue her pregnancy—the abortion 
question—but rather on her decisions regarding how to conduct her life 
during her pregnancy.  In the fetal abuse context, the state’s interests are 
not preservation of the mother’s health and the protection of potential life 
against intentional termination, but the enhancement of the born child’s 
quality of life through protection of the fetus from reckless or negligent 
harm.  Roe’s holding that the state’s interest in the birth of a fetus does not 
become compelling during the first two trimesters of pregnancy does not 
rule out the existence of a compelling state interest in ensuring that fetuses 
that will be carried to term are born unharmed.  States may have a greater 
interest in preventing future suffering of those who will be born than in 
ensuring that any particular fetus will be born.61 
The basic argument is that the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy does not 
conflict with her responsibility for the life of her unborn child because the state has 
an interest in protecting the quality of life that will be brought to term.62  As 
explained by one bioethics expert, Professor John A. Robertson, once a woman 
decides not to end her pregnancy she assumes certain obligations to refrain from 
causing harm to the future child.63  Some authors challenge this position, arguing that 
                                                                
58
“The state’s interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.” 
492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989). 
59505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (adopting an undue burden test). 
60Id. at 871. 
61Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of 
“Fetal Abuse,” 101 HARV. L. REV. 994, 997 (1988) (citations omitted). 
62Terres, supra note 11, at 71. 
63John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and 
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 438 (1989) (arguing that a woman who chooses not to abort 
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it creates the proverbial slippery slope and opens the floodgates to prosecute 
pregnant women for any activity that might conceivably harm their fetuses.64  A 
response to this criticism is that the floodgates will not be opened if the legislation is 
targeted only at conduct that is already illegal. 
One commentator who advocates government intervention to curb prenatal drug 
use insists that parental rights can and should be expanded without the troubling 
characterization of the unborn as “persons”.65  As stated, the unborn can be protected 
like snaildarters or historic buildings.66 
Some note that no one has a privacy right to take an illegal drug.  At the same 
time, the state has a strong interest in curbing drug use that is closely linked to fetal 
distress.67  Therefore, the mother’s right to reproductive privacy and personal 
autonomy should not shield her from government intervention.68 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF DUTIES AND CORRELATING RIGHTS 
A.  Maternal Obligations and Duties 
The debate discussed above largely turns on different views on what obligations, 
if any, a woman assumes after she has decided not to terminate a pregnancy.  Does a 
pregnant woman owe any moral or common law duty to the fetus to refrain from 
                                                          
has a legal and moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably 
possible).  See also Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police:  The Health Policy and Legal 
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 277, 292 (1987-88) (asserting that a woman waives her right to autonomy and 
assumes a duty of self-care after she decides not to abort); Barbara Shelley, Maternal 
Substance Abuse:  The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights? 92 DICK. L. REV. 691, 713-
14 (1988) (noting that the critical point of state intervention is when the woman chooses to 
carry the fetus for the full term and not exercise her right to abort). 
64McGinnis, supra note 46, at 518. 
65See Jeffrey A. Parness, The Legal Status of the Unborn After Webster, 95 DICK L. REV. 
1, 21 (1990). 
66Id. 
67E.g., Note, supra note 61, at 1007-08. 
68Obviously, the analysis of proposed legislation would be significantly different if the 
government undertook to regulate some conduct that would otherwise be legal if the woman 
was not pregnant.  This is one of the obstacles the government must overcome if it seeks to 
control alcohol consumption by pregnant women.  Government intervention in the case of 
gestational alcohol abuse is more complicated than intervention in the case of illegal drug use 
because it is normally legal for a person to imbibe alcohol.  Despite the fact that the 
consumption of alcohol is generally legal, the government could take steps to control the 
gestational alcohol abuse.  Any legislation criminalizing gestational drug use could be 
compared to criminal legislation related to driving while intoxicated (DWI).  With DWI 
legislation the state converts legal drinking into illegal conduct due to the fact that the conduct 
occurs while a person is driving a vehicle.  Clearly, the difficulty in adopting similar 
legislation targeting gestational alcohol use is identifying and monitoring levels of 
consumption.   
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using illegal drugs?  Although members of society may recognize a moral obligation 
of a mother to her fetus, it does not follow that there is a legal obligation.69 
The inextricable link between the pregnant woman and the fetus militates toward 
recognizing at least a moral duty to protect fetal health.  New scientific evidence and 
technical developments have produced a wealth of information revealing how a 
pregnant woman’s actions and omissions affect the fetus.70  The difficulty in 
determining the extent of a woman’s moral duty relates to the fact that practically 
everything a pregnant woman does conceivably affects the fetus.  Should pregnant 
women be treated as “fetal containers” or saints whose conduct is governed by a 
standard based on the best interest of the fetus?71  Does a woman fail to meet her 
obligations to the fetus when she does not take enough vitamins or takes over the 
counter drug?  Does a woman meet her duty to the fetus if she fails to take some 
action that would improve fetal health, but avoids conduct that causes harm, such as 
smoking tobacco, drinking alcohol or using illegal drugs?72  These questions 
illustrate the difficulty in defining the scope of a pregnant woman’s moral duty to 
protect fetal health.  Various authors have criticized perspectives and approaches that 
view women as if they are “fetal containers” subject to control by pregnancy police.73   
To some the most troublesome issue involves reconciling such a moral duty to 
the fetus with a pregnant woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy.  Those who 
oppose abortion might simply dismiss the question by saying that no reconciliation is 
necessary or possible.  In their opinion, any termination of a pregnancy would be an 
immoral violation of a woman’s duty to the fetus. 
Another approach is to re-conceptualize the maternal duty as a duty to the unborn 
child, rather than to the fetus.  Using this approach, a woman still can exercise her 
legal right to terminate a pregnancy.  On the other hand, if she chooses not to 
terminate the pregnancy she owes a duty to the future child who has not yet been 
born.  Basically, by electing not to terminate she assumes a moral duty to the unborn 
child to refrain from causing harm to the future child.  In discussing the distinction 
between a duty to the fetus and the duty to an unborn child, one author suggested that 
this duty of care to refrain from doing harm to the unborn child is the same as the 
duty owed to any stranger.74  A pregnant woman may end her duty by having an 
                                                                
69See Patricia A. King, Should Mom Be Constrained in the Best Interests of the Fetus? 13 
NOVA L. REV. 393, 399 (1989) (noting that courts may convert moral obligations into legal 
ones in an effort to coerce “the least willing members of the community to conform to moral 
norms”). 
70See id. at 396 (identifying an extensive list of maternal behaviors that affect a fetus). 
71See id. at 397 (suggesting that requiring that a pregnant woman do everything in the best 
interest of the fetus effectively requires that she act as a “saint”).  
72In distinguishing conduct that could properly be regulated Professor King notes that 
requiring that “harm or evil not be inflicted is different from requiring that harm or evil be 
removed.”  Id. at 397.  “The proposition that we have a greater obligation to refrain from 
causing harm than to promote good finds support in common notions of morality as well as 
law.”  Id. at 397-98. 
73The term “fetal containers” appeared in the early scholarship of George J. Annas, 
Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP 13 (Dec. 1986). 
74Deborah Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits on State 
Intervention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J. L. PUB. POLICY 19, 37 (1985). 
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abortion.75  If, on other hand, she chooses not to have an abortion, “she places herself 
in a special relationship with her future child, a relationship that carries certain 
inherent obligations similar to those of any parent toward his or her child.”76   
Using this approach, one would have to determine the scope of parental obligations 
to a child.  Does a parent have a moral obligation to submit to a bone marrow 
transplant in order to save the life of her child?  Does a pregnant woman have a 
moral obligation to submit to fetal surgery in order to protect the health of the fetus?  
These questions illustrate the difficulty in defining the scope of a pregnant woman’s 
moral obligation to the fetus. 
Despite this lack of clarity on the scope of the pregnant woman’s moral 
obligation, some advocates of “fetal rights” still insist that the moral obligation to 
protect fetal health should be recognized as a legal obligation.  In support of this 
position, these advocates point to the dictum in Roe where the Court said that a 
“woman can not be left alone in her privacy.”77  In the context of the Court’s 
opinion, this dictum is not very helpful in determining if a mother owes a legal duty 
to her fetus.  Therefore, “Roe’s effect on the judicial refinement of the legal duty a 
mother owes her unborn child remains unclear.”78 
The Roe opinion has split on the question of the existence of a legal duty owed 
by a pregnant woman to protect fetal health.79  In Grodin v. Grodin, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals found a woman liable to her child for taking tetracycline while 
pregnant.80  In its opinion the Michigan appellate court indicated that a mother 
should bear the same liability as a third person would bear for negligent infliction of 
prenatal injury.81  Similarly, in Smith v. Brennan the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
recognized a child’s cause of action for negligent prenatal injury, stating that a “child 
has a legal right to begin life with sound mind and body.”82 
Other courts have reached different conclusions on the existence of a mother’s 
legal duty to the fetus.  In 1999, a Texas appellate court considered a child’s claims 
against the mother for injuries resulting from the mother’s illegal drug use.  In a case 
of first impression, the Texas appellate court held that Texas state law does not 
recognize a cause of action in tort for injuries caused by the mother’s negligent or 
grossly negligent conduct.83  Similarly, in Stallman v. Youngquist,84 the Supreme 
                                                                
75Id. 
76Id. 
77410 U.S. at 159. 
78David E. Koropp, Setting the Standard:  A Mother’s Duty During the Prenatal Period, 
189 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 505 (1989). 
79Susan R. Weinberg, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health, 58 IND. L.J. 531, 535 
(1982-83). 
80301 N.W. 2d 869, 870 (Mich. Appeals 1980). 
81Id. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination on the 
“reasonableness” of the negligent conduct.  Id. at 871. 
82157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960). 
83Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W. 2d 474 (Tex. Appeals—Dallas, 1999) (no pet. history).  The 
appointed conservator for the child brought suit against the mother. 
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Court of Illinois refused to recognize that the mother had a common law duty to the 
fetus.85  Although the Stallman court recognized the important state interest in fetal 
well being, it deferred to the legislature as the more appropriate forum.86  This 
appears to be an invitation for legislative action to promote fetal health under the 
auspices of state interests. 
States can adopt different types of legislation targeted at curbing prenatal drug 
use.  For example, state legislatures could require that pregnant drug addicts obtain 
treatment and refrain from the use of illegal drugs.  As noted above, opponents of 
this type of legislation fear that the creation of such a duty would interfere with the 
privacy and autonomy interests of the pregnant women by recognizing “fetal 
rights.”87  The following discussion of rights and correlating duties suggests that the 
states can adopt legislation dealing with prenatal drug use without recognizing “fetal 
rights.”  
B.  Analysis and Critique of Hohfeld’s Correlatives  
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld analyzed the legal conceptions of rights and duties in 
his work, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.88  
Hohfeld systematically discussed legal conceptions such as rights, duties and 
privileges rhetorically and as a system of mutually self-defining relations.89 
Hohfeld began his discussion of jural relations by noting that strictly fundamental 
legal relations are sui generis and “[that] attempts at formal definition [prove to be] 
unsatisfactory.”90  Therefore, Hohfeld believed that the most promising line of 
procedure was to consider the “relations” in a scheme of opposites and correlates.91  
In his system of classification, Hohfeld identified eight legal conceptions: four 
primary legal entitlements (rights, privileges, powers and immunities) and their 
opposites (no-rights, duties, disabilities and liabilities).92  “Rights are claims 
                                                          
84531 N.E. 355 (Illinois 1988). 
85Id. 
86Id. at 361. 
87See King, supra note 69 at 399 for a general discussion of privacy and equity concerns in 
recognizing a legal duty of a woman to her fetus. 
88Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913).  A continuation of the article appeared later in 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 
YALE L. J. 710 (1917).  The references in this paper will refer to the article appearing in 23 
YALE L. J. 16 (1913).  Since Hohfeld’s publication of this analysis, his system has been 
debated.  Those who have adopted the Hohfeldian scheme include conservative scholars on 
one end of the spectrum and critical legal scholars on the other end.  See Calvin R. Massey, 
Law’s Inferno, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1269, 1273, n. 11 (1988) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A 
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES) (1987). 
89J. M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1119, 1120 (1990). 
90Hohfeld, supra note 88, at 45. 
91Id. at 30. 
92Id. 
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enforceable by state power that others act in a certain manner in relation to the 
rightholder.”93  A privilege is a negation of a legal duty, as in the privilege against 
self-incrimination in the face of a duty.94  “Powers are state-enforced abilities to 
change legal entitlement held by oneself or others.”  An example of a power is when 
a property owner has the legal power to transfer the property.95  “An immunity is 
security from having one’s own entitlement changed by others,” which amounts to a 
freedom from legal liability.96   
In connection with the four primary entitlements, Hohfeld sets forth negations or 
opposites of the entitlements.  These connections or references are the essence of 
Hohfeld’s theory.  According to Hohfeld, “a legal meaning cannot be ascertained 
without reference to its partner, either opposite or correlative, and the relationships 
embodied therein.”97 
Using this approach, the negations or opposites of a primary entitlement refer to 
the absence of entitlement.  The opposite of a right is what Hohfeld deemed to be 
“no right.”  Under Hohfeld’s scheme, a person has “no right” if he or she has no 
claim enforceable by state power.  With this concept of opposites, a person has either 
one or the other of the opposites.  This is different from Hohfeldian analysis of 
correlatives, which describes dynamic legal relations between two parties.  If the 
state recognizes a right and confers an advantage on some party, it simultaneously 
creates vulnerability on the part of others.98  This vulnerability or disadvantage is the 
legal correlative that is a matching interest held by at least one other person.  A 
claim-right correlates with a legal duty.  For example, a lessor has a right to receive 
rental payments and the lessee has a duty to make rental payments.  Basically, 
Hohfeld believed “that rights and duties are best analyzed, not as moral absolutes 
owed or demanded from the whole world, but rather as different aspects of a bilateral 
relationship between parties.”99  
Some scholars have challenged this bilateral feature of the Hohfeldian system.  
They note that legal relationships are in fact triadic in nature, with the sovereign and 
the courts as the third element in the triad.100  Jural relations are triadic even when the 
                                                                
93Joseph William SinGer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986 (1982) (analyzing Hohfeld’s fundamental 
legal conceptions). 
94Id. at 40. 
95Id. at 45. 
96Id. at 55. 
97H. Newcomb Morse, Applying the Hohfeld System to Constitutional Analysis, 9 
WHITTIER L. REV. 639, note l (1988). 
98Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham  
to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV 975, 987 (1982). 
99Patrick Dooley, The Unreasonableness of Requiring a Warrant for Searches of Non-
Resident Aliens in a Foreign Country:  United States v. Verdugo-urquidez, 20 CAL. W. INT’L. 
L.J. 355, note 48 (1989/90). 
100Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1191, 1254 
n. 217 (1990) (noting that the formulation of the objection to the Hohfeld primary terms is 
based very loosely on R. Dworkin’s discussion of choice of law in TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1978)). 
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government confronts an individual.  For example, in the collection of taxes, “the 
government” must be divided into those officials who claim a tax and those who 
decide a dispute and impose sanctions.101 
Other critics question whether the duties imposed by the criminal law or other 
areas of public law necessarily correlate with rights of individuals to claim 
performance of those duties.  In fact some philosophers, including Jeremy Bentham 
and John Austin, took the view that there are some legal duties for which there were 
no correlative rights.102  
In his LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, Austin described some obligations 
as absolute duties, which exist independently of any correlative right.  He described 
absolute duties as those prescribing actions toward parties other than the one obliged, 
who are not determinate persons, such as members generally of an independent 
society and mankind at large.103  As indicated by the following passage, Hans Kelsen 
also believed that there were legal obligations that were not always connected to 
legal rights of individuals: 
If the obligated behavior of one individual does not refer to a specifically 
designated other individual (that is, if it does not have to take place with 
respect to a specifically determined individual) but refers only to the legal 
community as such, then--although one sometimes speaks of a “right of 
the community” (especially of the state) to the behavior of the obligated 
individual, such as the obligation to do military service—one is satisfied 
in other cases to assume a legal obligation without a corresponding reflex 
right: for example in the case of legal norms that prescribe a certain 
human behavior toward some animals, plants, or inanimate objects by 
pain or punishment. . . These are obligations that—indirectly—exist 
toward the legal community interested in these objects.104 
The Hohfeldian response to this position would be that any judicial question still 
concerns two parties.  In the case of a criminal statute, some person acting on behalf 
of the government seeks enforcement of a legal duty.  The representative of the 
government is viewed as a person who on behalf of the government has a right to 
require that another person fulfill a duty.  Stated differently, a claim-right asserted 
against the state or a claim asserted by the state is always a claim asserted by some 
living flesh and blood person that is empowered in some way and recognized by 
courts.105 
Joel Feinberg takes a different approach arguing that some claim-rights do not 
have correlative duties.  In his essays entitled “Duties, Rights and Claims,” and “The 
Nature and Value of Rights,” he examines the extent to which duties and Hohfeld’s 
                                                                
101See JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 166 (1973). 
102J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 81 (1980). 
103Dane, supra note 100, at 1254, n. 217 (noting that the objection to the Hohfeld primary 
terms is based very loosely on R. Dworkin’s discussion of choice of law in TAKING RIGHTS 
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104HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 128 (M. Knights trans. 1967). 
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“claim-rights” are logically correlative.106  Feinberg identifies classes of normative 
relations called “duties.”  These “duties include duties of indebtedness, commitment, 
reparation, need-fulfillment, reciprocation, respect, community membership, status 
and obedience.”  Feinberg distinguishes the classes of duties and describes why some 
of the duties are necessarily correlated with other people’s rights while others are 
not.107 
Under Feinberg’s scheme, duties imposed by law are characterized as “duties of 
obedience.”  In discussing the example of a police officer who demands a motorist 
stop, Feinberg questions whether the police officer has a personal right to demand 
that the motorist stop.108  Rather, it appears that the officer has an official right 
derived from the police officer’s status.  Noting that some duties of obedience are 
“owed” to impersonal authority like “the law,” Feinberg concludes that some duties 
of obedience do not seem to entail correlative rights.109 
In dialogues on duties and correlating rights, one example that is frequently used 
is the “duty” to give to charity.  Although one may have such a duty to make 
charitable contributions, it does not follow that the potential donee has a right to 
demand the charitable contribution.  For example, both the American Bar 
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”)110 and the 
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”)111 
include aspirational provisions urging attorneys to provide pro bono legal services as 
part of attorneys’ professional obligations.112  This pro bono obligation or duty of 
attorneys has been recognized by all states that have adopted some version of the 
Model Code or Model Rules.  Despite the provisions in legal ethics codes, indigent 
persons would face difficulty in establishing a right that requires attorneys to meet 
this professional duty.113 
                                                                
106JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY—ESSAYS IN SOCIAL 
JUSTICE 130-155 (1980).  In the preface, Feinberg noted that his discussion was limited to 
what Hohfeld called “claim-rights.” 
107See id. at 130-39. 
108See id. at 138. 
109Id. 
110The MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1981) states:  “Every 
lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to 
participate in serving the disadvantaged.  The rendition of free legal services to those unable to 
pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer.” 
111MODEL RULES OF PROF’S CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) states, in pertinent part, that 
a lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. 
112The revised Model Rules approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 2002 expressly 
state that every lawyer has a “professional responsibility to provide legal services to those 
unable to pay.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002). 
113In Texas, farm workers filed a class action against the State Bar of Texas. The plaintiffs 
sought a court order requiring the State Bar to enforce a mandatory pro bono program.  
Among other things, the plaintiffs have based their action on the provision in the Texas 
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct stating that lawyers should render public interest 
legal service.  The matter was placed on the administrative docket of the Supreme Court of 
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Whether a person agrees with Feinberg and other writers who maintain that 
certain duties do not create corresponding rights, or if a person takes a Hohfeldian 
approach, it is not necessary to recognize “fetal rights” in enacting statutes related to 
prenatal drug use.  Under Hohfeld’s scheme, the representative of the government 
has a right to require compliance with statutes and the pregnant woman has the 
corresponding duty to comply.  Using Hohfeldian analysis, the imposition of a duty 
by the government on a pregnant woman would not create corresponding “fetal 
rights” because the fetus would not be part of the legal relationship.  Rather, it is a 
matter between the state (or a representative of the state) and the pregnant woman.  
The duty imposed by the state is a duty owed to the state or the community.  It is not 
a duty owed to the fetus. 
Even scholars who do not subscribe to Hohfeld’s doctrine of logical correlatives 
should reach a similar conclusion.  Using their analysis, the government unilaterally 
would impose a legal duty on the pregnant woman.  Once again, it is a matter 
between the state and the pregnant woman. 
This analysis of duty and correlating rights can be used to address the concerns of 
women’s rights advocates who fear that any government regulation of prenatal drug 
use will inevitably affect a woman’s privacy rights.  Many women’s rights advocates 
are genuinely concerned that any intervention will amount to a recognition of “fetal 
rights,” and ultimately affect a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.  
These concerns might be allayed if the women’s rights advocates understand that the 
government can impose a legal duty which is owed to the state, without any 
recognition of “fetal rights.”  
V.  THE UTILITY AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
Having determined that the legislation targeting prenatal drug use does not 
require the recognition of fetal rights, the next step is to evaluate the advisability of 
adopting criminal legislation that punishes women for not getting drug treatment.  As 
an analytical framework, the evaluation can use utilitarian theory of justice in 
assessing the interests served in adopting legislation criminalizing prenatal drug use. 
The basic tenet of utilitarianism is “the greatest good for the greatest number.”  
The criterion of the rightness of actions refers to the consequences.114 The morality 
of any kind of act will then depend on whether or not it will promote consequences 
more favorable than those produced by some alternative.115  Different versions of 
utilitarianism take different approaches in evaluating the consequences. 
In assessing the utility of legislation relating to the maternal-fetal relationship, 
lawmakers should weigh the proposed benefit with the costs to the individual 
woman, the fetus, and society.116  Undoubtedly, the state has a legitimate public 
health concern in facilitating the treatment of pregnant women.  This treatment 
serves that interest, as well as the general welfare of the individual woman and the 
fetus. 
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114CONRAD D. JOHNSON, MORAL LEGISLATION 1 (1991). 
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116Elizabeth L. Thompson, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct During Pregnancy:  
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28 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:11 
 
In the case of maternal conduct, a justification for a criminal law related to the 
prevention of prenatal drug use would be found in the value asserted by society in 
condemning harmful behavior and in attempting to prevent the behavior.117  
Although this may be a desirable goal, the question remains as to whether a criminal 
statute would actually deter harmful behavior.  Due to the nature of drug addiction, 
numerous commentators doubt that the adoption of legislation criminalizing prenatal 
drug use will significantly deter women from using illegal drugs.118  In support of 
their argument, they note that drug users apparently are not deterred by the existing 
criminal laws relating to illicit drugs.119 
Moreover, the critics maintain that the negative consequences of criminalization 
must be considered in weighing the costs of the legislation.  Specifically, they 
express concern that legislation criminalizing prenatal drug use will only deter 
women from seeking prenatal care.  The same objection has been expressed with 
respect to statutes that empower the government to civilly commit women for 
mandatory treatment.120  If pregnant women fear being “turned in” by their doctors, 
they may not get the health-related services that they desperately need.  Obviously, 
the failure of women to obtain adequate care will result in more fetal and maternal 
problems.   
The American Medical Association (AMA), the largest medical society in the 
United States, expressed these concerns in its Amicus Curiae Brief filed in the 
United States Supreme Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.  In asserting that 
criminal sanctions are ineffective in halting drug use by pregnant women, the AMA 
argued that criminal sanctions actually increase the risk of harm by discouraging 
prenatal and postnatal care and undermining the physician/patient relationship.121  In 
its brief the AMA emphasized that drug addiction is a disease that cannot be 
overcome by self-discipline.122  As explained, “one of the fundamental characteristics 
of drug dependency is the inability to reduce or control substance abuse, despite the 
possibility of adverse consequences.”123  According to the AMA, only “consensual 
treatment” can overcome the illness of drug addiction.124  Therefore, the AMA 
                                                                
117Id. 
118See e.g. Antoinette Clarke, Fins, Pins, Chips & Chins:  A Reasoned Approach to the 
Problem of Drug Use During Pregnancy, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 634, 659 (1994) (arguing 
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maintains that “criminal sanctions are unlikely to achieve the goal of deterring drug 
use among pregnant women.”125 
Other medical groups share this view in opposing criminal prosecutions of 
pregnant women.  The sentiments of health care providers are summarized in the 
following statement made by various medical groups in connection with the 
prosecution of one California mother:   
Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it may 
discourage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from 
providing accurate information to health care providers out of fear of self-
incrimination.  This failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital 
information concerning her health could increase the risk to herself and 
her baby.126  
Clearly, this is a very serious concern given that the principle objective of 
intervention should be to curb prenatal drug use and to promote health of the mother 
and unborn child.  If criminal legislation actually deters women from obtaining 
treatment, the only purpose criminalization serves is to punish socially undesirable 
conduct.127  The proposal discussed below is intended to address this concern.  
VI.  PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION THAT TREATS DRUG ADDICTION AS A DISEASE 
As noted in the introduction, the majority of the articles written on prenatal drug 
abuse tend to fall into one of two camps: (l) those advocating government action; and 
(2) those advocating a woman’s right of privacy and autonomy.  Authors in both 
camps see a conflict between women’s rights and “fetal rights.”  This conflict is 
more like a battle where one party wins and the other loses.  In focusing on 
treatment, the following proposal intended to create a “win/win” situation where the 
interests of the mother, the unborn child and the society are served. 
The proposal is based on opinions of medical and addiction experts who urge 
treating drug abuse as a disease.128  The United States Supreme Court has recognized 
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Common Sense:  Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTING WOMEN’S L.J 243,  244-245 
(2001) (urging a multidimensional collaborative effort to dealing with maternal substance 
abuse). 
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drug addiction as an illness requiring treatment.129  As stated by the Court, persons 
addicted to narcotics “are diseased and proper subject for [medical] treatment.”130  
The proposed legislation provides meaningful assistance to addicted women, 
including services that may help prevent addicted women from getting pregnant.  
The proposed public health legislation incorporates four major components: 
education, testing, addiction intervention, and effective treatment.  Taken together 
these features operate as a comprehensive government program.  
The first portion of the program focuses on prevention by educating women on 
the dangers of prenatal drug use, as well as the importance and availability of 
treatment.  This education should start with mandatory programs in secondary 
schools.  Government sponsored public service announcements on television and 
radio can reach the general population.  Finally, public health agencies can produce 
and distribute brochures to be made available in medical clinics and offices of 
physicians who provide primary medical care.  All publicity and educational 
materials should communicate the humanistic message that the community cares 
about the pregnant drug user and that she should care enough to get treatment.  This 
message will also help foster the sense of duty if the pregnant woman decides to 
have a child. 
Serious problems associated with prenatal drug use early in a pregnancy can be 
avoided if women get drug treatment before they know they are pregnant or take 
precautions not to become pregnant.  This early intervention is very important 
because research has revealed that the most damage to a fetus occurs early in the 
pregnancy.131 
The second feature of the government program is public health legislation 
providing for drug testing of pregnant women.  All physicians treating pregnant 
women would be required to administer a test for specified drugs, unless the 
pregnant woman objects.  In two respects this approach to testing differs from the 
Charleston testing program that the United States Supreme Court declared to be 
unconstitutional in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.132  First, the testing proposed here 
effectively requires that women provide their informed consent before being tested.  
Second, the proposed testing would be conducted purely for medical purposes.  By 
law the results of the tests would be confidential and unavailable to law enforcement 
authorities.  Women would be advised that the testing would be confidential, but not 
anonymous.133  They would be told in writing that a positive drug test would be 
                                                                
129Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law that 
imprisons a drug addict as a criminal inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution).  
130Id. at 667 (citing Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)). 
131Experts view the first eight weeks as the most critical period for normal embryonic 
development. Janet Severson, Stopping Fetal Abuse with No-pregnancy and Drug Treatment 
Probation Conditions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, n.51 (1994) (citing Louis G. Keith et al., 
Drug Abuse in Pregnancy, in DRUGS, ALCOHOL, PREGNANCY AND PARENTING). 
132532 U.S. 67, 88-86 (2001).  See supra note 3. 
133A similar approach is used under the Texas statute requiring that physicians test 
pregnant women for certain diseases, including HIV.  See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY § 81.090 
(2001). 
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reported to a specified public health agency that arranges for formal drug counseling 
with the woman.134 
In his concurring opinion in Ferguson, Justice Kennedy appeared to endorse the 
validity of mandatory testing conducted for medical purposes.  Justice Kennedy 
referred to “reputable sources” in making the following observation: 
[W]e must accept the premise that the medical profession can adopt 
acceptable criteria for testing expectant mothers for cocaine use in order 
to provide prompt and effective counseling to the mother and to take 
proper medical steps to protect the child.135 
This approach to mandatory testing of all pregnant women who do not object 
addresses various problems associated with discretionary testing.  First, it eliminates 
possible discrimination that results when physicians exercise discretion.136  Second, it 
forces all physicians to deal with the drug issue with all women.  Even though 
women have the right to refuse testing, they all benefit from receiving information 
on drug addiction, the effect of drugs on the fetus, and available treatment.   
Trained drug counselors will contact those women who do consent to testing if 
their tests are positive or they indicate a desire for further counseling.  The 
counselors conduct formal drug addiction interventions such as those commonly 
done to encourage addicted persons to get treatment for their disease.  The 
counselors would also provide information on available social services that will 
improve the likelihood that treatment would be obtained and effective.  At the time 
of the intervention, the counselor must evaluate the financial condition of the 
pregnant woman.  If the counselor determines that the pregnant woman does not 
have the means to finance drug treatment, the counselor will certify that the woman 
qualifies for the government to pay the reasonable costs of drug treatment. 
This leads to the most important feature of the program--government funding and 
support of treatment programs.  After testing and intervention, comprehensive 
treatment must be made available.  For effective treatment, facilities must be 
prepared to meet the medical and psychological needs of pregnant addicts and help 
the women deal with social service issues such as transportation and childcare.137  
Experts report that drug addiction can best be treated through full service treatment 
                                                                
134By contrast, in Minnesota positive results are reported to a public welfare agency that 
can take steps to have the woman civilly committed. 
135532 U.S. at 90. Justice Kennedy went on to say that the testing ought not to be 
invalidated if prosecuting authorities then adopt “legitimate procedures” to discover the test 
results and prosecution follows.  Id. 
136In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the record suggested that the discretionary testing 
resulted in protocol that “disproportionately targeted indigent, African-American women.”  
Brief of Petitioners at 12, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936). 
137See Brief of Amici Curiae National Abortion Rights League, et al., at 13-17, Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) (describing the essential elements for 
effective treatment of pregnant drug addicts).  
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that combines behavior and pharmacological therapies with social service 
interventions.138    
The government should take various steps to insure the availability of adequate 
treatment facilities.  First, the government should require that state funded medical 
programs assist individuals who cannot afford drug treatment.  With regard to 
privately funded health care, state regulators could require that health insurance 
policies cover the cost of treatment programs.   
In connection with this legislation, steps must also be taken to eliminate all 
barriers to drug treatment facilities.  The government should prohibit treatment 
centers from discriminating against pregnant women.  Treatment centers that have 
refused to treat pregnant women claim that they cannot risk the potential liability 
exposure of treating pregnant women.  This problem needs to be addressed.139 
VII.  SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSAL 
The obvious advantage of this proposal is that it is intended to secure treatment 
for pregnant women who are addicted.  This proposal approaches drug addiction as a 
serious public health problem that merits government intervention.  Unlike 
“backward looking” legislation which punishes women for drug use, this proposed 
legislation requires drug education and facilitates treatment by providing for formal 
drug counseling and intervention by trained personnel.  Such a proposal is consistent 
with a woman’s duty to herself, as well as her duty to society.   
Unlike civil commitment or criminal legislation that may deter treatment, the 
proposed legislation encourages treatment.140  This is significant because pregnancy 
appears to be a “window of opportunity” for treating addiction.  In interviews with 
150 drug-using mothers in New York City, three fourths of those interviewed 
reported concern for their children as the major motivation for initiating treatment.141  
Formal intervention and counseling provided by trained persons should strengthen 
this motivation.  
In treating drug addiction as a disease that requires medical and social service 
intervention, the proposal does not undermine the physician-patient relationship.  
Instead, the program reinforces the relationship by requiring that physicians provide 
information on drug addiction and treatment to improve both maternal and fetal 
health.  As stated by the American Medical Association,  
[W]hen physicians and patients work together, with a shared goal of 
achieving the best possible outcome for mother and child, outcomes are 
improved.  With appropriate prenatal counseling, women will reduce the 
                                                                
138Steven Stocker, Drug Addiction Treatment Conference Emphasizes Combining 
Therapies, National Institute on Drug Abuse NOTES, http://www.nida.nih.gov/ 
NIDA_Notes/NNVol13n3/combining.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). 
139One approach might be to give treatment facilities some limited form of immunity from 
claims relating to the complications caused by the drug dependency. 
140In the trial court in the Ferguson case, women testified that they stopped getting 
prenatal care because of the risk of drug testing and possible arrest.  Brief of Petitioners at 10, 
supra note 136 
141Proponents of “fetal rights” would also assign a value to the interests of the fetus.  With 
such an analysis, treatment would also serve the interests of the fetus. 
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impact of their addiction on their fetuses . . .  A drug-testing policy truly 
committed to reducing harm to children in utero would, therefore, 
encourage frank and full communication between patient and physician.142   
In requiring counseling, consensual testing, and the availability of treatment, the 
proposed program is intended to foster communication and facilitate treatment.  
Because physicians only perform testing following client consent, physicians guard 
the confidences of patients, only providing information to public health authorities.143  
With this approach, testing is a tool of treatment, not a tool of criminal enforcement.  
This enables physicians to work together with their patients and public health experts 
in treating addiction as a disease. 
Finally, the policy behind this proposal goes beyond an attempt to legislate 
morality.  Unlike some paternalistic legislation that prevents persons from harming 
themselves, this proposal is designed to prevent a mother from harming society and 
the unborn child, who is a future member of the community.  In most cases, the 
community has to bear the financial burden of caring for the infant who suffers the 
effects of prenatal drug use.  In addition to the state’s financial interest, the state also 
has an interest in prohibiting the gestational use of drugs because that behavior can 
cause permanent damage to future members of the community.  Therefore, even 
assuming that one’s own use of drugs such as cocaine is legalized, society would still 
have an interest in curbing drug use by pregnant women.  With that approach, what 
is relevant is the harm to society and the unborn child, not the harm to the mother 
herself.  In that event, the principal public policy justification is that intervention is 
appropriate to curb drug use that inflicts damage on society. 
VIII.  UTILITARIAN RECKONING 
In consequentialist terms, the proposal appears to be beneficial in adopting a 
medical model to facilitate the treatment of the disease of drug addiction, while not 
discouraging prenatal and postnatal care.  This ultimately benefits the woman and the 
community, as well as the unborn child.  Experts report that treatment also helps the 
woman’s other children.144  In various ways, treatment also benefits the state and 
community.  If women are treated, astronomical costs of caring for drug-addicted 
infants can be avoided.  The avoidance of these medical costs would benefit those 
private insurance companies that provide medical coverage for insured persons, as 
well as the public assistance programs that provide funding for medical care to 
indigent persons.  Comparing the cost of drug treatment to the costs of neonatal 
intensive care that averages approximately $2,000 per day, both the insurance 
companies and government would be paying considerably less for drug treatment.  If 
women get treatment, states could also avoid the continued expenses of caring for 
children who are more likely to be mentally and physically impaired.   
                                                                
142Brief of Amicus Curiae American Medical Association, supra note 121 at 14. 
143Compare Brief of Petitioners at 26, supra note 136 (arguing that mandatory 
nonconsensual testing is “radically at odds” with the historical obligation of the medical 
professional to guard the confidences of patients as a “sacred trust.”). 
144In asserting that the “unique opportunity for positive intervention during pregnancy 
should not be lost,” the AMA noted that “drug treatment, when possible, is critical for a 
woman’s other children.”  Brief of Amicus Curiae American Medical Association, supra note 
121 at 20. 
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In addition to reducing the specific costs associated with prenatal drug use, 
treatment reduces other costs associated with drug use.145  For example, studies have 
revealed that drug treatment reduces drug use by forty to sixty percent, significantly 
decreasing criminal activity associated with drug use.146  Conservative estimates 
indicate that every one dollar invested in addiction treatment programs results in a 
return of between four and seven dollars in reduced drug-related crime, criminal 
justice costs, and theft alone.  Finally, the community and individuals benefit when 
treatment reduces interpersonal conflicts, improves workplace productivity, and 
reduces drug-related accidents.147 
An additional feature of the legislation requiring testing and counseling 
intervention is that it effectively requires that the government take steps to insure that 
treatment be available.  The legislation could only be enforced if treatment is 
available and affordable. 
Admittedly, under the proposed legislation women may not consent to testing.  
Even those women who refuse testing will benefit from receiving counseling and 
information on drug treatment.  To gauge the effectiveness of the intervention 
program, the legislation could require that medical providers report statistics on the 
number of women who refuse testing. 
Opponents of legislation might still assert that any intervention infringes on a 
woman’s liberty and personal autonomy.  Given the fact that information and 
possible treatment would also benefit the woman, such infringement seems 
reasonable under the circumstances.  Finally, from a communitarian perspective, 
community-based drug treatment programs help individuals develop as responsible 
members of the community.148  As compared to other types of intervention or 
inaction, such an approach is “far less costly, far more humane, and most importantly 
it offers a far greater chance of success.”149 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
Prenatal drug use is a health care problem that merits appropriate government 
action.  Given the societal interest in curbing drug use, such action can be taken 
without recognizing “fetal rights.”  For years the medical community has opposed 
criminal prosecutions and legislation targeting prenatal drug use.  Instead, medical 
experts have urged that drug addiction be treated as a disease.  The proposed 
legislation takes such an approach in providing education, testing, counseling 
intervention, and treatment services in an effort to curb prenatal drug use.  The 
proposal can be justified on the basis of utilitarian theory in that the legislation 
serves the interests of both the mother and community.150   
                                                                
145See Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction: What Science Says, National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, http://www.drugabuse.gov/Teaching3/teaching5.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). 
146Id. 
147Id. 
148Kubasek & Hinds, supra note 34, at 13. 
149Id. at 14. 
150Proponents of “fetal rights” would also assign a value to the interests of the fetus.  With 
such an analysis, treatment would also serve the interests of the fetus. 
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Legislators who desire to eradicate prenatal drug use must make a concerted 
effort to provide the treatment that mothers desperately need.  In discussing the clash 
of rights between the pregnant woman and her fetus, one commentator states that it is 
difficult to determine who will emerge victorious.151  All parties could emerge 
victorious if the government treats drug addiction as a public health problem 
meriting intervention. 
                                                                
151Barrett, supra note 35, at 237. 
